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Introduction
Irene Calboli and Martin Senftleben

I. Expansion of the Trademark Domain
During the past decades, the domain of trademark law and the scope of trademark protection have been expanded significantly.1 The flexible application of
prerequisites for registration has paved the way for the recognition of a wide variety
of signs as subject matter eligible for trademark protection. This includes single
colors, shapes, sounds, smells, video clips, holograms, and even gestures.2 With the
elastic conceptual contours drawn in the trademark section of the 1994 Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),3 this remarkable
growth of the trademark universe—the inclusion of so-called “non-conventional”
or “non-traditional” types of marks—has become a worldwide phenomenon. While
not establishing an obligation to accept non-traditional types of marks at the national
level, the 2006 Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks reflects the willingness
of policymakers across all continents to facilitate the registration of traditional and

1 Cf. Irene Calboli, Chocolate, Fashion, Toys and Cabs: The Misunderstood Distinctiveness of Non-
Traditional Trademarks, 49 Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. & Competition L. 1 (2018); Martin R.F.
Senftleben, Trade Mark Protection—A Black Hole in the Intellectual Property Galaxy?, 42 Int’l Rev.
Intell. Prop. & Competition L. 383 (2011).
2 With regard to the debate on non-traditional types of marks at the beginning of the new
millenium, see Ivo Lewalter und Paul T. Schrader, Die Fühlmarke, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und
Urheberrecht 476 (2005); Felix Hauck, Aktuelle Entwicklungen bei der Eintragung von Farbmarken,
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 363 (2005); Annette Kur, Alles oder Nichts im
Formmarkenschutz?, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht—
International Teil
755 (2004); Adrien Bouvel, Qu’importe le flacon . . . Le droit des marques malmené par les emballages,
Propriétés Intellectuelles 863 (2004); Ruth Arnet, Markenschutz für Formen, sic! 829 (2004);
Jochen Pagenberg, Trade Dress and the Three-Dimensional Marks—The Neglected Children of Trademark
Law?, 35 Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. & Competition L. 831 (2004); Markus Bölling, Der EuGH und
die abstrakte Farbmarke—Von der bewussten Entwertung einer Markenform, Markenrecht 384 (2004);
Senta Bingener, Das Wesen der Positionsmarke oder Wo die Positionsmarke hingehört, Markenrecht
377 (2004); Alison Firth, Ellen Gredley, & Spyros M. Maniatis, Shapes as Trade Marks: Public Policy,
Functional Considerations and Consumer Perception, Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 86 (2001).
3 TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 15(1), Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
Introduction. Irene Calboli and Martin Senftleben. © Irene Calboli and Martin Senftleben 2018.
Published 2018 by Oxford University Press.
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non-traditional marks alike.4 Recent bilateral and plurilateral international trade
agreements continue on the same path.
The extension of the domain of trademark protection to non-traditional marks
can be placed in the context of modern branding and marketing strategies. Today’s
marketers seek to create a brand experience for all senses that has the potential to become a product in its own right and a core asset of the trademark owner’s business.5
For this purpose, traditional word and figurative marks are supplemented with non-
traditional brand insignia that are often more abstract and conceptual. Modern advertising campaigns may have success in educating consumers to make a connection
between a specific color, design feature, or smell, and a particular origin of goods and
services. Interestingly, trademark law and practice follow and support this trend in
branding and marketing even though it blurs the concept of “trademark” by going
far beyond traditional word and figurative signs.
This far-reaching support for modern branding and marketing strategies is not
an international obligation. International law offers national legislators the opportunity to draw hard boundary lines and set limits to the expansion of the realm of
trademark protection. For instance, WTO Members are free to make it a condition
that trademarks be “visually perceptible”.6 Nonetheless, countries hesitate to avail
themselves of this option to categorically exclude sound and smell from the circle
of registrable signs. Additional room for an outright exclusion of certain categories
of signs could follow from the invocation of traditional notions of trademark law,
such as the distinction between the mark and the product. In theory, a trademark is
a sign attached to the product. It should not constitute the product itself. Otherwise,
indefinitely renewable trademark protection may impede the continuous evolution
of new products in the marketplace. For the protection of products and product
features, the intellectual property system offers innovation-based systems with a
limited term of protection, such as patent, industrial design, and copyright law.
Applying a strict mark/product dichotomy, trademark protection could be confined
to signs that are attached to goods. In consequence, signs that form part of the goods
themselves, such as product shape and other design features, would fall outside the
domain of trademark law from the outset. In practice, however, lawmakers and
judges have abandoned the traditional distinction between mark and product in
many countries.7 Apparently, it is deemed preferable to keep the doors to trademark
4 See Rule 3, Regulations Under the Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks (as in force on
Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/singapore/, which deals with a wide variety of non-
traditional types of marks.
5 J.E. Schroeder, Brand Culture: Trade Marks, Marketing and Consumption, in Trade Marks and
Brands—An Interdisciplinary Critique 161 (Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2008); D. Scott, A. Oliver, &
M. Ley-Pineda, Trade Marks as Property: a Philosophical Perspective, in Trade Marks and Brands—An
Interdisciplinary Critique 285, 296 (Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2008); Ralph S. Brown, Advertising
and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 108 Yale L.J. 1619, 1622–34 (1999); Mark A.
Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687, 1706–07 (1999).
6 TRIPS art. 15(1).
7 Article 3 of the EU Trade Mark Directive 2015/2436, for instance, provides the following illustrative list of signs that are eligible for trademark protection in EU Member States: ‘personal names, or
designs, letters, numerals, colours, the shape of goods or of the packaging of goods, or sounds.’
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protection open, leave the filtering of inappropriate signs to trademark offices and
tribunals, and the regulation of the scope of protection to decisions on infringement.
In the absence of clear-cut exclusions from trademark protection, open-ended
legal instruments form the center of gravity in the regulation of non-traditional
marks. On both sides of the Atlantic, courts are struggling with the application of
the concept of technical and aesthetic functionality as a tool to police the borders
of trademark protection and prevent encroachments upon freedom of competition
and freedom of expression. To this day, however, neither U.S. judges nor their EU
colleagues have found the sorcerer’s stone for applying the functionality doctrine in
a consistent manner.8
The kingpin of the trademark protection system—the basic requirement of
distinctiveness—does not necessarily offer more satisfactory solutions. With regard
to non-traditional types of marks, courts may make an attempt to pose additional
obstacles by holding that consumers are not in the habit of making assumptions
about the commercial origin of goods and services on the basis of product shape or
color.9 To establish distinctive character, brand owners will thus have to prove the acquisition of distinctive character through use in trade. Inherent distinctive character
seems unlikely in the absence of exceptional circumstances. It remains to be seen,
however, whether this configuration of the test of distinctive character is a robust
normative correction or a mere empirical assumption. If it is based on the empirical
observation that consumers are not used to non-traditional marks, then the assumption becomes weaker and weaker with every non-traditional identifier of commercial
source which brand owners imprint in the minds of consumers.10 With advertising
campaigns educating consumers to understand shape, color, sound, and smell as
indications of commercial origin, the argument of consumers having difficulty with
the source-identifying function of these signs loses its power of persuasion.
Instead of functioning as a robust bulwark against the continuous expansion of
the domain of trademark protection, the pinnacles and towers of the test of distinctive character are thus in danger of being demolished on the basis of empirical
findings. Its remnants may be surmounted rather easily. In the context of trademark
registration, distinctiveness has come to mean little more than “recognizable” by
the human senses when it is applied to individual features of the signs for which

8 Cf. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to Trademark Law, 84
Iowa L. Rev. 611, 685–91 (1999); Annette Kur, Too Pretty to Protect? Trade Mark Law and the Enigma
of Aesthetic Functionality (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research
Paper No. 11-16, 2011).
9 See, e.g., Case C-218/01, Henkel v. DPMA, 2004 E.C.R. I-1725, ¶ 52; Joined Cases C-53/01 to
55/01, In re Linde & Others, 2003 E.C.R. I-3161, ¶ 48; Case C-104/01, Libertel Groep v. Benelux-
Merkenbureau, 2003 E.C.R. I-3793, ¶ 65.
10 Cf. Lotte Anemaet, The Public Domain is Under Pressure: Why We Should Not Rely on Empirical
Data When Assessing Trademark Distinctiveness, 47 Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. & Competition L. 303
(2016); Martin R.F. Senftleben, Public Domain Preservation in EU Trademark Law—A Model for
Other Regions?, 103 Trademark Rep. 775, 801–03 (2013); Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks
and the First Amendment, 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 1095, 1150 (2003); Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as
Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982
Wis. L. Rev. 158, 170 (1982).
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trademark protection is sought. In line with the TRIPS Agreement,11 signs only need
to be “capable of distinguishing” commercial source under most legal definitions
today. Even in countries, such as the U.S., that require secondary meaning to register certain categories of non-traditional marks, the bar to prove distinctiveness is
low. This development seems to be a corollary of the international preference for
a registration-based grant of protection. Following this approach, it is sufficient
that a sign appears capable of fulfilling the basic trademark function of identifying
commercial source to grant exclusive rights and afford the trademark proprietor the
opportunity to develop genuine use activities in the coming years. Instead of focusing on whether the sign has already proven to function as a badge of origin, it is
sufficient that the sign has the capacity of distinguishing products per se. Trademark
applicants may thus argue that a sign is distinctive because it constitutes a specific,
recognizable product feature. If trademark offices accept this focus on product
features and refrain from establishing a high threshold for demonstrating a specific source-identifying effect, trademark protection will become widely available
for non-traditional marks.

II. Problems Inside and Outside Trademark Law
In other words, the current system is in danger of becoming circular in the sense that
any recognizable sign, including products and product features, is eligible for trademark protection. This could include the shape of Kit-Kat and Toblerone chocolates,
the Lego manikin, the Rubic’s cube, the red sole of Louboutin shoes, the shape of
Bottega Veneta bags, and the shape of the London cabs—which are all recognizable
design features (if not the products as such), but have never been intended to serve
as identifiers of commercial source, but rather constitute designs or creative works
which, as such, deserve protection under industrial design or copyright legislation.
In many jurisdictions, this risk of circularity following from an elastic concept of
distinctiveness is coupled with a weak system of counterbalances—both in terms
of absolute grounds for refusal and trademark defenses. For example, historically,
shape marks could not be registered, at all, in several countries, including the United
Kingdom and Germany. These categorical exclusions are long gone and have been
replaced, in several countries, with more flexible registration criteria that prevent
trademark registration to a much lesser extent. These include the aforementioned
exclusions of signs are that “functional” from a technical or aesthetic perspective. In
fairness, courts have increasingly resorted to these provisions to deny protection of
non-traditional trademarks.12 But these cases appear as the tip of the iceberg when
11 TRIPS art. 15(1).
12 Developments in the EU can serve as an example in this regard. See the decisions Case C-299/
99, Philips v. Remington, 2002 E.C.R. I-5475, ¶ 82 and Case C-48/09 P, Lego v. OHIM, 2010 E.C.R.
I-8403, ¶¶ 45, 53–58, about technical functionality which lead to a far-reaching exclusion of technical
subject matter even if alternative technical solutions exist. In addition, the potential of the doctrine
of aesthetic functionality has been enhanced significantly in Case C-205/13, Hauck v. Stokke, 2014
E.T.M.R. 60, ¶¶ 19–20, where the Court developed a list of flexible factors for the identification of signs
that are to be excluded from trademark protection for this reason.

5

Introduction

5

considering the numerous cases that are settled. Moreover, no sound defenses have
been crafted to date to limit the use, and potential abuse, of exclusive rights relating
to non-traditional marks. For example, it remains difficult to invoke the defense for
using a mark in a descriptive or decorative manner in these contexts.13
Not surprisingly, the inclusion of non-traditional marks in the canon of protected
signs raises severe problems within the system of trademark protection. The erosion
of the traditional mark/product dichotomy, the risk of exhausting the spectrum
of attractive signs and granting anti-competitive control over important signs in
a given category, the tendency of over-protecting non-traditional marks in the absence of well-developed defenses, and the deterrent effect of excessive trademark
infringement claims and related litigation costs are examples of legal-doctrinal and
practical challenges. Courts across the world seem to share these concerns. Several
courts have invalidated prominent non-traditional marks in recent years.14
Nonetheless, it seems safe to assume that these cases are just a small fraction of
the claims that are brought (at times arbitrarily) by trademark owners. Most of
the claims lead to settlements in secret, and often involve licensing or coexistence
agreements, or simply acceptance by third parties of the prohibition to use signs
coming close to a registered non-traditional mark. As only defendants with “deep
pockets” can afford expensive and lengthy litigation, the potential chilling effect
of protecting non-traditional marks should not be underestimated. Even though
prominent marks have been cancelled, many are still registered.
The repercussions of the decision to protect non-traditional marks, however, go
far beyond the trademark system itself. As the various chapters in this Book describe in detail, the recognition of new types of marks substantially broadens the
areas of overlap between trademark, industrial design, and copyright protection.
Three-dimensional objects may serve as shape marks. A short melody may constitute
a sound mark. A computer animation may qualify as a motion mark. Even single
colors—the raw material of paintings—are registrable. With this broader range of
signs qualifying as trademarks, right holders obtain unprecedented opportunities
to acquire an amalgam of trademark, industrial design, and copyright protection.
New areas of overlap emerge with regard to applied art and other forms of cultural
expression, in particular sculpture and plastic art, musical compositions, and audiovisual creations.
Given the different configuration of copyright and industrial designs law on the
one hand, and trademark law on the other, it is not surprising that the cumulation

13 For instance, see Case C-408/01, Adidas v. Fitnessworld, 2003 E.C.R. I-12537, ¶¶ 39–41, where
the Court established an ambiguous test by holding that “the fact that a sign is viewed as an embellishment by the relevant section of the public is not, in itself, an obstacle to the protection conferred by
Article 5(2) of the Directive where the degree of similarity is none the less such that the relevant section
of the public establishes a link between the sign and the mark.” For decisions illustrating the weakness
of the descriptive use defence in this context, see Case C-102/07, Adidas v. Marca, 2008 E.C.R. 2439,
¶¶ 47–49; Case C-48/05, Adam Opel v. Autec, 2007 E.C.R. I-1017, ¶ 44; Case I ZR 175/09, “Medusa,”
German Federal Supreme Court, ¶¶ 19–20 (Nov. 24, 2011).
14 The list of decisions in this respect is lengthy. We thus refer, here, to the cases cited and discussed
in the various chapters published in this Book and the cases cited therein.
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of rights leads to tensions and inconsistencies within the system of intellectual property protection: indefinitely renewable trademark rights may thwart the objectives
underlying copyright and industrial designs law, in particular the aim to ensure
the free availability of designs and literary and artistic works after the expiry of the
limited term of copyright and industrial design protection.15 Trademark rights that
remain after the end of copyright and industrial design protection have the potential to seriously impede the cycle of innovation in product design and literary and
artistic creations which the rule of a limited term of protection supports. Additional
interferences with cyclic cultural innovation may follow from the fact that infringement criteria and limitations of protection are not harmonized across trademark,
industrial design, and copyright law. A right holder enjoying cumulative protection
may have success in bringing a trademark claim even though the allegedly infringing
use would not amount to infringement in the light of copyright or industrial designs
infringement standards.16
The proliferation of non-traditional trademark registrations, applications, and
the recent wave of litigation in this area is thus symptomatic of a larger disease of
intellectual property maximization on the basis of an accumulation of rights. Not
surprisingly, some of the most heralded law suits in this area involve companies
trying to prolong their exclusive rights on valuable products through trademark protection, as trademark law offers a relatively low barrier to protection at comparably
low costs, and the prospect of potentially high rewards once protection is granted.
Trademark rights, however, are supposed to relate to signs that are needed to distinguish products in the marketplace. They should not be available for every recognizable product feature just because an additional layer of trademark protection can
benefit the manufacturers.
From the bird’s eye perspective of fundamental rights, these problems can be
placed in the context of freedom of competition and freedom of expression. The
extension of trademark protection to non-traditional types of marks can have serious effects on market competition as these marks often protect products, or parts
of products, per se. In addition, the protection of non-traditional marks can prevent socially and culturally valuable uses. The potential harm that the protection
of these signs can entail for market competition as well as freedom of expression is
even more dramatic when one considers that the protection granted to trademarks
15 Cf. Martin R.F. Senftleben, Vigeland and the Status of Cultural Concerns in Trade Mark Law—
The EFTA Court Develops More Effective Tools for the Preservation of the Public Domain, 48 Int’l
Rev. Intell. Prop. & Competition L. 683 (2017); Irene Calboli, Overlapping Rights: The Negative
Effects of Trademarking Creative Works, in The Evolution and Equilibrium of Copyright in the
Digital Age 52 (Susy Frankel & Daniel J. Gervais eds., 2014); Annette Kur, Funktionswandel von
Schutzrechten: Ursachen und Konsequenzen der inhaltlichen Annäherung und Überlagerung von
Schutzrechtstypen, in Geistiges Eigentum im Dienst der Innovation 23 (Gerhard Schricker et al.
eds., 2001); D.W. Feer Verkade, The Cumulative Effect of Copyright Law and Trademark Law: Which
Takes Precedence?, in Intellectual Property and Information Law—Essays in Honour of Herman
Cohen Jehoram 69 (Jan J.C. Kabel & Gerard J.H.M. Mom eds., 1998).
16 For a discussion of this risk, see Martin R.F. Senftleben, Overprotection and Protection Overlaps in
Intellectual Property Law—the Need for Horizontal Fair Use Defences, in The Structure of Intellectual
Property Law: Can One Size Fit All? 136–81 (Annette Kur & Vytautas Mizaras eds., 2011).

7

Introduction

7

may last in perpetuity. In the case of non-traditional marks that acquire the status
of well-known17 or famous marks (U.S.), or the status of marks with a reputation
(EU), trademark law enhances the corrosive effect of protection by extending the
scope of protection to dissimilar goods and services and use in non-competitive
situations. Trademark offices should thus (continue to) apply appropriate safeguards
against registration, and trademark courts should (continue to) develop sufficient
safeguards against over-enforcement of rights in non-traditional marks. This is crucial to ensure undistorted market competition and support freedom of expression,
and ultimately prevent abuses of the trademark system.

III. Taking Stock
Against this background, the purpose underlying this Book, and the collection of
essays published in it, clearly comes to light: as non-traditional marks have found
their way into trademark registers worldwide, the time has come to take stock. Which
law and practice has evolved with regard to these marks during the last decades? How
do trademark offices and courts address the wide variety of issues—ranging from
legal-doctrinal to competition-based and cultural concerns—that are raised by the
inclusion of non-traditional marks in the trademark system? Which positions have
evolved in the debate on the continuous expansion of the domain of trademark protection? Which repercussions does this expansion have on other branches of intellectual property protection and the intellectual property system as a whole?
Offering a fresh, critical, and interdisciplinary analysis of the questions raised by
the acceptance of non-traditional marks, the contributions to this Book provide an
insightful academic—and at the same time practical—review of the topic. Across
different jurisdictions, trademark offices and courts have rendered decisions on non-
traditional marks against the background of their individual national and regional
doctrines and traditions. This pool of decisions serves as a starting point for a discussion and comparison of different approaches to non-traditional marks. Providing
a comprehensive overview of the status quo in different regions and countries, the
chapters in the Book offer a cutting-edge discussion of legal problems and solutions
in the field of non-traditional marks. As Editors, we are confident that, given the
richness and diversity of the contributions, the Book can offer a careful and comprehensive analysis of the legal-doctrinal, competition-related, and cultural issues
arising from the protection of non-traditional types of marks.
The Book is divided in two Parts. The first Part assesses the status quo reached
in the legal treatment of non-traditional trademarks, including the history
leading to the current international and national protection, and the unresolved
legal challenges that still affect the protection of these marks, especially the
boundaries of trademark protection. Denis Croze’s chapter opens this Part with
a historical reconstruction of the international negotiations and protection of
17 TRIPS art. 16(3).
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non-traditional trademarks, with particular attention to the work of the WIPO
Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks and the WIPO treaties. This
historical reconstruction is followed by a detailed empirical study by Michell
Adams and Amanda Scardamaglia, which offers a twenty-year retrospective on
non-traditional trademarks, using the European Union, the United Kingdom,
Singapore, Japan, and Australia as case studies.
Several doctrinal chapters follow this empirical study. First, Dev Gangjee analyzes
the current legislation and the changes that have been applied to the registration
of non-traditional trademarks, primarily in the EU. In particular, he addresses the
question whether the current legislative system can successfully manage the tensions
that the registration of these marks generates. He suggests that an equivalent of prosecution history estoppel may be needed in trademark law to resolve several of these
tensions. A comprehensive review authored by Annette Kur follows. It addresses
the leading case law in Europe from the adoption of the First European Trademark
Directive to date. Kur devotes specific attention to the reform of EU trademark law
and new safeguards against overbroad protection of non-traditional marks that have
arisen in this context, in particular the new limitation of protection which exempts
fair use of non-distinctive signs and indications. This European analysis is followed
by an exhaustive review of the leading and current cases and applicable law in the
U.S. by Justin Hughes. This chapter addresses and criticizes, in particular, the birth
and developments of the judicial doctrine of aesthetic functionality in the U.S.
The following chapter also addresses the U.S., but from a different angle. Notably,
Deven Desai turns to branding and the analysis of marketing practices to explain
the rise of the expansion of trademark protection and the recent wave of registration of non-traditional trademarks. Ultimately, Desai argues against the protection
of non-traditional marks.
The following chapter, authored by Ng-Loy Wee Loon, devotes attention to
the dilemma surrounding the international community’s attitude toward the protection of non-traditional trademarks and the acceptance of the functionality
doctrine as a ground for refusal and important counterbalance, particularly in
respect of shape marks. Ng-Loy highlights that the travaux préparatoires of the
Paris Convention indicate that Paris Union members could not agree on a definition of a “trademark,” particularly whether product shape marks could constitute trademarks. However, this resistance was later overcome with the definition
that was inserted into the text of the TRIPS Agreement. Nonetheless, she sees
room for the categorical exclusion of shape marks on the basis of functionality
considerations—without violating international law. The following chapter by
Michael Handler focuses on the infringement analysis in cases arising from the
protection of non-traditional trademarks. The chapter focuses on the requirement
that, in order to find trademark infringement, a sign should be “used as a trademark” and the possibility to use this requirement as a suitable safeguard against
overbroad protection that would stifle free speech and free competition. Exploring
the potential of the trademark use requirement, Handler’s analysis sheds light on
an important balancing tool at the infringement stage that may supplement—and
potentially even substitute—functionality considerations at the registration stage.
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Part I is concluded by the chapter authored by Haochen Sun, which addresses a
series of cases litigated by Hermès in China with emphasis on the decision by the
Chinese courts to reject Hermès’ request to register the shape of its Kelly bag as a
three-dimensional trademark in China.
Building upon this analysis, the second Part of the Book focuses on assessing the
impact of the protection of non-traditional trademarks on market competition,
culture, and freedom of expression. The first chapter of this Part is authored by
Gustavo Ghidini, who provides a doctrinal review of the problems which the protection of non-traditional trademarks can cause with regard to market access to similar signs by competitors. In the following chapter, Glynn Lunney uses an analysis
based on law and economics to argue against the protection of non-traditional
marks, again based on the concern that they may lead to perpetual monopolies on
product features that were not supposed to be protected as trademarks when trademark laws were originally adopted in a variety of jurisdictions. Lavinia Brancusi
brings the analysis of market access and the challenges created by non-traditional
trademarks within the realm of competition law in her chapter. In particular, she
examines several leading cases from the EU in this context. This economic analysis
is continued in the contribution authored by Carolina Castaldi, an innovation
economist, who offers the first systematic empirical analysis of the extent of filings
of non-traditional trademarks using data from the USPTO. Arul Scaria and Kaya
Mannen conclude the series of chapters dedicated to the challenges that non-
traditional trademarks bring to market competition with a contribution focusing
on a specific angle of this phenomenon: the impact of this protection on the marketing of generic pharmaceuticals. Notably, the chapter shows that protection for
non-traditional marks in the pharmaceutical sector could pose significant barriers
to access to medicine, particularly by increasing transaction costs and creating new
barriers to generic entry.
Moving beyond the analysis of challenges that non-traditional trademarks may
have on market competition, Irene Calboli’s chapter focuses on the impact that the
protection of these marks may have on product creativity and innovation. She argues
that, by recognizing and protecting as marks elements that are product design and
aesthetic product features, the protection of non-traditional marks supports a system
that promotes standardization and repetition of the same features. The following
chapter, authored by Martin Senftleben, warns that non-traditional trademarks may
have a corrosive effect on cultural follow-on innovation. As a solution, Senftleben
argues for a broader application of public interest-related grounds for refusal which
lead to a categorical exclusion of non-traditional signs from trademark protection.
This focus on the public interest is continued in the chapter that follows, which is
authored by Lisa Ramsey. In particular, Ramsey argues that the right to freedom of
expression may be harmed by granting trademark rights in certain non-traditional
marks. She explains that non-traditional trademarks may intrinsically convey information, ideas, or other messages unrelated to the trademark. Therefore, trademark
laws regulating this inherently valuable expression should have a sufficient justification, and governments should repeal or revise laws protecting non-traditional
marks when they do not directly further trademark law’s goals and harm expressive
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values more than necessary. Katya Assaf-Zakharov, in her conclusive chapter, argues
that protecting non-traditional trademarks may become a form of cultural control, which supports cultural dominance by a certain privileged few—the trademark
owners and those who can afford their products—at the expense of the rest of society
which is deprived of freedom to use imitations of these signs and, in turn, their cultural meaning.

